Research interests
In broad terms, I’d say my research focuses mostly on either (a) questions about the foundations of ethics, or (b) questions about the nature of moral cognition. But within those very general areas, my research and writing over the past several years has clustered around the following topics and issues in particular:
- Emotion (What is an emotion? What kind of role, or roles, might the emotions play in our moral lives? How are emotions expressed and perceived?)
- Moral judgment (By what kind of mental or psychological process do we arrive at our moral intuitions and other normative or evaluative beliefs?)
- Expressivism (What do we express when we use moral language sincerely? Can ethical expressivism account for all the features of ordinary moral discourse?)
- Evil (What does it mean to say that an action or person is evil? Must a person be evil in order to perform an evil act? Does performing an evil act make you an evil person?)
- Mental illness (What is mental illness? How are mental illness, well-being, and happiness related? When, if ever, are agents with psychiatric disorders morally responsible for their actions?)
Book
The Meaning of Evil. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. (Paperback released in August 2018.)
Articles & chapters
"The Self as a Reason to Regulate: Dispositional Emotion Regulation & Shaftesbury on Integrity of Mind"
Philosophical Topics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2019): 129-148
"Rethinking the Thin-Thick Distinction among Theories of Evil (and Then Rereading Arendt)"
Arendt Studies, Vol. 3 (2019): 173-194
"Emotions and Their Expressions" (with Dorit Bar-On)
In The Expression of Emotion (Cambridge University Press)
"Being Good and Feeling Well"
Res Philosophica, Vol. 92, No. 4 (2015): 785-804
"Ethical Expressivism"
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?" (with Dorit Bar-on and Matthew Chrisman)
In Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics (Oxford University Press)
"Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory"
The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2014): 533-549
"Varieties of Expressivism" (with Dorit Bar-On)
Philosophy Compass, Vol. 8, No. 8 (2013): 699-713
Philosophical Topics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2019): 129-148
"Rethinking the Thin-Thick Distinction among Theories of Evil (and Then Rereading Arendt)"
Arendt Studies, Vol. 3 (2019): 173-194
"Emotions and Their Expressions" (with Dorit Bar-On)
In The Expression of Emotion (Cambridge University Press)
"Being Good and Feeling Well"
Res Philosophica, Vol. 92, No. 4 (2015): 785-804
"Ethical Expressivism"
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?" (with Dorit Bar-on and Matthew Chrisman)
In Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics (Oxford University Press)
"Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory"
The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2014): 533-549
"Varieties of Expressivism" (with Dorit Bar-On)
Philosophy Compass, Vol. 8, No. 8 (2013): 699-713
Media
- I'm quoted a few times in this article at The Atlantic about refusing to say Donald Trump's name.
- My friend and colleague, Chauncey Maher, published a book about plant minds. I did the illustrations for the book, some of which are included in his posts at "The Brains Blog."
- Dickinson College has published a couple of articles about me. Here's one, and here's another.
